The War of 1812 is a
different event depending on the side involved. To the United States,
it was the Second War of Independence, when they re-established their
presence in the world by proving that they were more than a vassal of
Britain. To Canada, it was a moment when they defended their homeland
from an invader. It could be said that it helped to unite a nation.
To Britain, it was a minor irritant during the Napoleonic Wars. To
the native Indian tribes, this war was the end of their hopes of
independence from the white settlers, helping to drive the final
nails into the coffin that their civilization had become.
The direct cause of the
War of 1812 involved perceived British mistreatment of the Americans,
over two issues – forced impressment and economic blockade. One of
the tools that Britain was using against Napoleon was a naval
blockade of European ports. This blockade was not only against enemy
powers, but also against shipping of neutrals, such as the United
States. Understandably, the United States resented having Royal Naval
vessels seize and search their vessels. There were even cases of
American ships being fired upon by British vessels if they resisted.
The international legality of a blockade was disputed, and led to
resentment on the behalf of other neutral powers.
This question of a
blockade can be seen as a clash of wills between two of the maritime
powers of the world, arguably the two greatest at this time (although
Britain had an obvious lead at this point.) The European blockade
restricted the free trade that American merchants demanded. As
Risjord put it, ‘(The Republicans thought) that the only
alternative to war was submission to the British Commercial System.’1
The issue of
impressment was just as important, perhaps even more so because it
allowed for martyrs. Immigration to the USA was unrestricted, and
there was little paperwork. For a dollar, it was possible to become
a US citizen, regardless of prior background or commitments. It was
possible for this system to be abused by deserting sailors, who would
often head ashore at American ports, where a growing merchant marine
provided them with higher pay and better conditions than those found
on Royal Naval vessels. This would even happen during the War itself,
as George Hay reflected, “I observed some of the men smile…(The
Commodore said) they are deserters from the man-of-war in which you
came to America.”2
At one point, it was estimated that ‘probably a quarter of the
50,000 to 100,000 seamen employed on American ships in this era were
British’.3
As desertion was a
crime, it was fairly common for RN vessels to ‘recruit’ at
American ports, sending their press gangs ashore. Worse still, they
would stop vessels flying the flag of the USA and take crewmen off
that they suspected were deserters. The problem with this was that
most of the people they picked up were American citizens, and it
could be a year before these people were returned – many were
forced to stayuntil the conclusion of hostilities. This caused
resentment against the UK in the USA.
To be fair, the British
government did make an attempt to resolve the disputes, but were
unwilling to relax the restrictions on commerce that were helping
them win their conflict with France. This conflict had not been a
clash of armies, but of economies. The war had continued whilst the
two sides had the strength to fight, and although there were plenty
of battles during this conflict, the war would ultimately be won by
the superior economy.
A shortage of sailors
meant that they were desperate for recruits, and had to acquire them
from anywhere they could. Deserters would rarely be punished by
death, but would be brought back into the Navy. Naturally, both sides
believed that they were in the right. In a way, Britain still saw the
US in its colonial style, dependant on the assistance of the UK for
its survival. This was certainly not true at this point; although it
is certain that the US did have exaggerated views of its power and
influence. It is a fact that the primary trading partner for the
United States was the UK. Indeed, more trade took place after
the War of Independence than before.
Over the late 1800’s
and early 1810’s, matters deteriorated, with a long chain of events
culminating in a declaration of war, ironically just before the
British dispatch detailing a settlement that would have been
acceptable to the United States arrived in Washington. This is one of
the examples of communication lag that would play an factor in the
war, especially at the battle of New Orleans.
To see the importance
of the Great Lakes, it is necessary to look at the goals that both
sides set themselves during the war. Britain was involved with the
war against France, and was unconcerned with capturing any US
territory. They simply wanted a status quo ante bellum, to restore
the borders to what they were before the war. To this end, they would
attempt to invade US territory, but with no interest in keeping it.
Retaking the United States would not be realistic. The aims of the
United States were more ambitious. They wished to secure Florida (the
aim they managed to fulfil), and in the north, they wished to conquer
Canada. To the British and Canadians, it was a war for control of the
vast fur trade areas of the Northwest.4
It was thought that
capturing Canada would be simple. The United States government
assumed that their army, bolstered by militia units, would be
sufficient to capture the populated areas of Canada. They hoped that
this would be accompanied by an uprising against British rule a
viewpoint that was incredibly naïve. The French settlers had little
interest in becoming part of the United States, as many of them had
left France to avoid a republic, and the English settlers had mostly
emigrated from the United States during the Revolution because they
were loyal to the British Crown – many had fought against the
United States in that war.
The war can be neatly
divided into two – the naval war, and the land war. The naval war
was fought in both major oceans of the world, but without any major
naval action. Individual battles were fought, but the War of 1812 had
no Trafalgar. The US Navy, being far smaller than the Royal Navy
(which had three naval guns for every American fighting
ship5),
adopted a technique of commerce raiding that had proven to be
effective in previous wars. (In fact, in 1812 the Royal Navy had
nearly 700 warships at sea, while the US Navy had only 17 seagoing
vessels and 165 gunboats.6)
They were successful in this, managing to cause severe disruption to
British trade in the Atlantic, and whaling operations in the Pacific.
The question must be asked whether they would have had such success
if the Royal Navy had not been tied up with France, but the fact of
their achievement remains. Also, the US ships, although numerically
inferior, were superior to their British counterparts, which caused
embarrassment to British naval designers of the period, and brought
about questions in the House.
The land war was
another question entirely. The lack of preparation of both sides made
itself felt, but the superiority of the British in the region became
obvious after a string of American defeats followed the inability of
the US Army to successfully invade Canada. Never was this more
evident than when British forces successfully captured Washington,
and burned down the White House after eating the President’s
victory dinner, prepared prematurely.
This land success on
the British side was difficult to follow up due to the problem with
the supply lines. This war was fought without modern methods of
transport, and with the road network between the USA and Canada
non-existent, sea or river transport was the only possibility. In
addition, there was the problem of an armed population, with a strong
sense of national identity and a history of fighting the British.
Such a force is hard to conquer, and would make occupation a
difficult goal. In any event that was never the intention of the
British. Occupation of key points and raids into enemy territory were
the main tactics employed by the British forces. It was the Americans
who sought occupation of Canada, but even this was recognized as
being more use as a bargaining tool in peace negotiations to secure
the ‘freedom of the seas’. Whilst there were certainly voices,
some of them high up in the American legislature, calling for an
incorporation of Canada into the United States, most recognised that
such an occupation would probably prove impossible.
The war in the Great
Lakes was dominated by Lakes Ontario and Erie. These Lakes, the
largest, were the most strategically important. If one side could
control them both, the hope was that they would be able to use them
to mount an invasion. As with the rest of the war, neither side was
prepared to fight on the Lakes. The only garrisons present were
staffed by reservists, and there were very few ships present. On Lake
Erie, the only British vessels were the ship Queen Charlotte
and the brig General Hunter, neither of which were in anything
like fighting condition. The US only had an army supply vessel, the
Adams, so if anything they had still greater difficulties.7
Lake Ontario had a slightly larger range of forces – the British
having four ships of 20, 14,12 and 6 guns respectively, and the US
having seven ships, of 18, 11, 6, 3, 3, 1 and 1 guns respectively.
Although the US outnumbered the British, the British had a critical
superiority in armament, that it was hoped would prove decisive.8
Additionally, and of grave importance to the British, there were the
war canoes of the Great Lakes Indians. Although useless in an actual
battle, they would perform good service as amphibious landing craft.
If either side had
managed to seize control of both lakes, they would have had a route
directly into the heart of the other nation, that would have been
difficult to block. The damage that could have been done would have
been considerable, but it is questionable whether it would have been
as decisive as was assumed. Any US force moving into Canada through
the Lakes would still have had to face a significant journey before
it reached any of the major settlements, and the supply line would
still have been intolerably long. A reversed situation would have
been slightly better, as Britain could have struck at more important,
but it is still questionable how much damage could have been done.
When the US failed to move northwards along the East Coast, mostly
through the failure of the state forces to advance (they maintained
that their duty did not involve them leaving US soil!), Britain
seized on an opportunity to advance.
It is interesting to
note that the campaign on the Great Lakes because progressively more
important to both sides for the reason that it was the most active
theatre in the war. Control of the Lakes became a matter of prestige,
and as it became obvious that neither side would win the war
conclusively, any victories became important for bargaining in the
peace negotiations. This grew more important to the United States
after the disastrous events of 1814, when the British captured
Washington, and the White House burned. At that point, they
desperately required a victory of some sort if they were to achieve
anything in the peace negotiations, and the Lakes were the only place
where it seemed possible they would attain it.
The War of 1812 is
notable for the fact that neither side was prepared to fight it. The
United States under Jefferson had cut back the army and navy. Indeed,
the United States Navy had to fight continually for its very
existence, and was always tiny. There had been a spell when a series
of seagoing vessels were constructed, and were used to good effect in
the Tripolitarian War. However, Jefferson had cut the Navy’s budget
and changed its role, from a seagoing to a coastal navy.
This matter was simply
a question of the differing roles a navy would be expected to play.
The original US navy was designed for a similar purpose as the Royal
Navy, to protect the trade of the US, as an insurance policy. The
gunboat navy, on the other hand, ignored the needs of trade, and
instead concentrated on coastal defence only, as well as internal
power projection (the state of the Union at that point meant that any
means of keeping the individual states in line was seized.) By 1812,
the US Navy consisted of only sixteen vessels, some of those not
ready for sea9,
not counting the gunboat fleet, much of which had been decommissioned
in 1809.
The US Army was barely
large enough to defend the frontier from Indian attacks, which to be
fair was its standard role. The British forces deployed in Canada
were also woefully insufficient. The United States had almost 12,000
regulars, whilst Canada could muster 7,000.10
Royal Naval presence was minimal, and only a few small Army units
were in position at the start of the war. The frontier only had a
small string of forts, and the geography of the region was not well
known at all. Large tracts of land along what would be the disputed
border had never even been mapped, a hazard to land, but especially
to naval operations.
Rather than regular
forces, the plan was to use militia forces that could more cheaply
and easily organized. For the British this would be a matter of
expediency, until regular troops could be brought in. Ships could
(and would) be constructed on site, as would other vital equipment,
although quantities had to be brought in from overseas. Sir James Yeo
continually asked for such supplies as canvas, twine, gun carriages,
and iron work for new ships, which had to be brought in from Quebec
or Montreal.11
It was also an
important consideration during this period that troops were still
tied up in the Iberian Peninsula. All of the most experienced
veterans were busy fighting for the defence of Portugal, a country in
which Britain had considerable investment. The navy was spread out
across the world protecting British interests from French attack, and
maintaining the blockade of the European ports. British forces were
spread too thin to make sending reinforcements to what, on the face
of it, was a relatively unimportant frontier, a practical matter.
For the United States,
the idea of militiamen was something quite different. It had been
‘citizen armies’ that had won the freedom of their fledgling
country during the Revolution. The idea of such forces, as enshrined
in the Constitution by the ‘right to bear firearms’ was a
prevalent one in the government, as it seemed to require little
investment. They assumed that in any future war, the militia armies
would be as successful as they had been previously. The United States
Navy barely survived the thirty years between the Revolution and the
War of 1812, because the dominant idea was that private ships could
be requisitioned, or outfitted as privateers. These were again ideas
that had worked before, and that it was assumed would work again. The
War of 1812 proved, however, that concepts fine in theory would often
fail in practice, with numerous issues of chain of command, and of
the rights of the soldier.
A key problem, which
the US Army faced during the War of 1812, was one that would be
resolved in their next major war, the issue of states’ rights over
that of the Federal government. Individual states would organize
their own armies to supplement the federal army. This caused two
problems. One was the issue of quality – some armies would be
well-trained and equipped, but more usually they were like most
armies trained in such a way – a collection of individualists, more
a mob than a trained fighting force. This problem was even worse with
regard to officers. Many officers, even general officers, were
appointed because of local popularity, not because of any
qualification or suitability for their post. Another problem
connected to this involved the chain of command. Individual states
took the view that they should determine the disposition and
operations of their armies, and this meant that orders were often
contradictory. Because the standard form was for federal officers of
equal rank to state officers to have seniority, promotions were
common. As state officers often had little or no experience or
training, placing them in command caused severe problems.
A major difficulty
faced by both sides, and one which meant that the Great Lakes were
crucial to the War, was the terrain of the border areas. In between
Canada and the United States is a large stretch of terrain that is
almost impassable. Settlement in the area was extremely limited, with
only a few farming settlements and logging communities. Investment in
Canada was in the northern region, or along the East coast. The
northern regions of Canada provided furs, but this trade did not
require a high population density in order to be successful. The
eastern coast was near some of the best fishing regions then known to
European traders, and these areas were fished extensively. The lumber
trade was also valuable, but none of these trades took place near the
US border, meaning that there was little incentive for investment in
the border regions. The northern border of the USA was as bad,
however.
Britain did possess one
advantage – an alliance with the local Indian tribes. Since Henry
Harrison burned an Indian village to the ground during peace talks in
1811, they had been more inclined to ally with the British against
the Americans, and this would prove to be of significant advantage to
the British, during and after the war. During the war they had
additional soldiers in their ranks that intuitively knew the
territory.
After the war, the
Indians were no longer as much of a problem for two reasons. The
first was that a significant portion of their warriors were killed,
and the second was that the leader of their civilization, a man named
Tecumseh, was killed in the war. The Indian problem in Canada was no
longer a problem, a significant gain for the British. The Indian
civilization in that region had been facing problems before the war,
with the incursion of British and American settlers into their
territory, but the decimation of their tribes was the final straw.
They were promised independence if they participated in this war, and
the creation of an Indian ‘buffer state’ between the US and
Canada, but realistically neither side would give up the territory
necessary to bring this about. Officers such as Lt. General Drummond
spoke out in official communications in their favour, “It is highly
satisfactory to know that the Interests of the Indians will not be
forgotten in any arrangement.”12,
but this did not translate to action.
Communication and
transport difficulties were the major problems along this frontier.
Road networks were almost non-existent, and the difficulty of the
terrain meant that off-road travel was slow, and dangerous, and led
to high levels of attrition. The lack of a supply network, combined
with the absence of many large centres of population, meant that
supply and communications were the greatest problems facing
commanders on the frontier. One method of transport that was
possible, of course, was river transport.
The Great Lakes have a
very high strategic value, in terms of communication and transport.
Hundreds of lakes, large and small, and an intricate river network,
meant that control of the Great Lakes would mean that the side that
controlled it would have a major advantage in any war. River
transportation was still an important part of industrial and economic
infrastructure in such times, and both nations would be able to take
great advantage of control of such a network. General Wolfe
originally conquered Quebec by rowing up the St. Lawrence during the
Seven Years War, something that would not have been lost on both
sides. Canada also used a river network, through which the valuable
fur and lumber trades were operated. Control of this network would be
critical, and control of the Great Lakes would be a significant step
towards acquiring such control. Indeed, Governor Tompkins of New York
stated that “stores cannot get further (to the Lakes) till we open
a secure passage for them”.13
There were, however,
difficulties to operations on the Lakes. As already stated, the area
was not well developed. The surrounding territory was heavily
forested, and not easy to traverse, but the biggest problem facing
both sides was the absence of accurate charts. On the lakes, this was
a hazard to naval operations, and on land it meant that navigation
was difficult. This problem could be remedied, and it is notable that
the more accurate charts that became available were created because
of this war.
The War on the Lakes
was initially marked by construction and preparation for conflict.
Both sides decided that the best way to proceed was to construct on
site, rather than ship the long, difficult way up to the Lakes from
the more industrialised regions. To organize this, both sent an
experienced commander to the region, as well as whatever forces they
could send. The idea was to build a cadre of experienced personnel
and officers, who would be supplemented by locally trained personnel.
However, on the British side, the Provincial Marine proved to be
highly ineffective, and was largely supplemented by the Royal Navy –
Marine officers being quickly removed from the command positions they
occupied. As Captain Gray14
stated, “The officers serving in this division of the Province are
in some instances extremely inefficient, and in short, totally unfit
for the situations they hold.”15
Commodore Sir James
Yeo, RN, had an interesting career before his arrival at the Lakes,
notable for the fact that he had never commanded a large ship or a
squadron. A Post Captain at the age of 23, he had spent all his time
in corvettes and similar small ships. Indeed, although as a Post
Captain he should have been transferred, he requested and was granted
permission to remain in command of a corvette, the Confidence.
His career was truly made, however, in 1809, when he led the
expedition that removed the last French colony from South America, an
action that earned him a Portuguese knighthood. His whole career was
a testament to a mastery of small ship action, in all manner of
theatres around the world, and the French Guiana campaign had given
him valuable experience with amphibious operations. It is not
difficult to see why such a man would be given the command in the
Great Lakes.
Commodore Isaac
Chauncey was a somewhat older individual, forty years old upon taking
his command. His first duty in the US navy would be one he undertook
many times – supervising the construction of a frigate, the
President. Although he served in the Mediterranean during the
Tripolitarian War, he saw remarkably little action, although he did
prove his bravery on more than one occasion. Between 1807-1811, he
was the commander of the New York Naval Yard, spending his time
organizing stores and overseeing the repairs of the tiny US Navy. He
continued in this assignment after war began, until he was posted to
command the Great Lakes campaign. Although, he stated, he had little
combat experience, he was an experienced naval administrator with
knowledge of shipbuilding, as well as being a highly respected
Captain in the US Navy.
These two appointments
alone give an indication of what the different sides anticipated in
the War of 1812. As has been seen, Britain had the upper hand on the
Lakes at the start of this war (one is tempted to say naval
superiority, but there were so few naval vessels on the Lakes at this
point that any sort of control would have been impossible to
enforce), and was hoping for a quick victory. So, they sent an
experienced small ship commander with knowledge of amphibious
operations. The US knew that their first task would be to build a
fleet before they could use it, and so they dispatched the commander
of one of their largest shipyards. Commodore Chauncey’s orders
stated that, “In addition to the public vessels now on the Lakes
you are at liberty to purchase, hire, or build…such others and of
such form & armament, as may in your opinion by necessary.16”
The choice of commanders is highly revealing to the viewpoint of the
administrations involved.
Also other senior
officers would be dispatched to the Lakes, it was planned that the
personnel required would be found on site, rather than being
recruited elsewhere. While the US had no alternative but to use its
own service personnel, the British were more fortunate (a matter of
opinion, considering the quality of the personnel provided) in having
the service of the Provincial Marine, a colonial unit formed for
colonial naval duties. They handled ‘Fresh-water’ engagements
such as these.
Another question must
be asked. Did the Lakes become a sink of material that could have
been better used in other areas? The fact that ships were constructed
on site might seem to suggest that this was not the case, but the
construction of fighting ships requires more than wood and will.
Cannons, ammunition, specialized naval supplies such as tar, all had
to be brought in from elsewhere.
The US Navy was small
during the war, with two missions. Their seaborne fleet did not
engage in general fleet actions, but instead concentrated on commerce
raiding, a tactic within their means. The resource drain to the Lakes
would primarily be in the form of experienced sailors and weaponry,
items that, to be fair, were not in short supply. Although its
military power was limited, the United States was a maritime power,
which did have some experience of combat at sea. These had been
reassuring to the Americans that their system would be successful, as
it had served them well in the limited conflicts they had been
involved in.
The second mission was
that dictated to it by Jefferson, that of coastal defence. Most of
the seaports of the US had an attendant gunboat. These ships were not
seaworthy, though they were suitable for river use. In the event,
this mission can only be called a failure, as they failed to protect
the US coast from the Royal Navy.
The Royal Navy of
course had more resources to spare – the difficulty was in
transportation across the Atlantic, of course. However, the fact that
Britain was involved on so many fronts meant that resources were not
as abundant as might be hoped. There was scarcity everywhere, but not
solely because of the campaign of the Lakes, or even the War of 1812
itself, which to Britain was only a minor irritant to a greater
conflict in Europe. It was, however, able to blockade the US coast
with relative ease.
War on the Lakes was
fought largely with materials constructed on site. Here again the
problems of slow communication and transport were evident. It took
time to get the new commanders in place, and time to get the
infrastructure established for the construction of ships.
Communications could often take longer to reach the commanders on the
Lakes from the coast of Canada than they would take to cross the
Atlantic, because of the difficult terrain. For such reasons,
shipping large amounts of material was out of the question.
The climatic conditions
were harsh, cold, with snowstorms and some ice. The weather was
stable, however, and sailing conditions were generally good. The
conditions were such, that the Royal Navy took pains to transfer
personnel who had served in the Baltic regions, according the idea
that they would already be adapted to the conditions to be faced in
this region. Problems due to conditions had been experienced before,
and it was naturally a good idea to get the most out of their
available personnel as possible.
The Americans had no
such worries over climatic conditioning, as they had numerous
personnel who were already conditioned. This is one advantage of
recruiting locally, in a militia system as opposed to a large
national army. The troops that form the local militia will have local
knowledge, and will be used to the conditions. Conditioned troops had
proved to be vital in such plague-ridden holes as the West Indies of
the 18th Century, where the majority of the stationed
troops would die of fever instead of in action. Fever would not be
such a problem along the Canadian border, but the severity of the
climate would have been. Such problems as hypothermia and frostbite
would have been familiar to these people.
So, the campaign on the
Lakes had a lot of potential to change the face of the war, at least
according to the viewpoints of those responsible for command
decisions. The Great Lakes represented what seemed to be an easy
opportunity for victory. The British assumed that their naval
superiority and the loyalty of the inhabitants, as well as their
Indian allies, would make the war easy to win. The Americans believed
that their advantages would also make the war simple – closer
sources of supply, more local militia strength, and their ‘moral
advantage’ over the British.
The general strategic
plan on both Lakes was a simple one – to secure overall control of
the territory by eliminating the enemy, through control of the
various harbours of the Lakes and the destruction of enemy vessels.
Each hoped for a decisive victory. The reality of the war was that
neither side managed the decisive victory they needed. Any partial
victory would be of far less use, as would victory on only one of the
Lakes. (Lake Erie was reasonably decisive, though it did take a while
– it was Lake Ontario that hosted the stalemate.)
With little in the way
of fighting ships on either lake, it was first important to find an
effective harbour where ships could be constructed. Many
considerations were important – defensiveness, strategic position
as regards projecting control of the Lake, and crucially availability
of supply, and proximity of communication routes. These
qualifications were not easy to fulfil, to say the least, and
compromises had to be endured. Lines of communication and supply
could be constructed if they were needed – how many towns have only
come into existence as the result of war – and defences could be
constructed.
The lack of ships, and
the inability for either side to transfer, was actually a minor
advantage in an odd way. The Lakes, being lakes, were fairly shallow,
and it is likely that any normal ship would have found its range of
operations limited. They would have been larger than required,
rendering manoeuvring more difficult than for the smaller ships that
were the major feature of action on the Lakes. Additionally, the
usage of shallow-draft ships enabled a wider range of harbours to be
considered, and minimized the amount of work that would be required
to bring them up to the quality that was required.
Of course, it still
meant that these ships had to be constructed, and this took time.
There were two advantages to combat on the Lakes, not available to
sea or ocean-based campaigns. The first of these was that many
supplies were more readily available. The coast would only be a short
journey away, and the banks were dotted with small settlements, which
could be counted upon to provide food, fresh water, and other such
commodities. Even if local settlements were not available, parties
could be put ashore to hunt for the plentiful local game. Timber was
naturally also plentiful.
The second was the
water in the lakes – fresh as opposed to salt. Salt is a corrosive
element for wood, and caused difficulties to sustained action at sea.
Campaigning in fresh water meant that this was not an issue. There is
also the point that drinking water would be rather easier to find in
a Lake than in the middle of the Atlantic. In addition, the cold
climate proved to be something of a boon. When a ship has to
transition between hot and cold climates, the wood will expand and
contract, warping. This increases the wear and tear on the ship
greatly, but was not an issue in this campaign. In addition, it was
recognized that the ships would not be needed for long. After this
war, they would be only of limited use, and so corners could be cut.
There were cases of ships being built with the expectation that they
would only fight a single battle – and on Lake Erie, this
expectation was met! So, constructing ships on site was not as much
of a handicap as might initially have been thought, as the quality
placed into the construction of seagoing ships intended for long
service was simply not required.
As stated, the obvious
strategy on the Lakes was to neutralize the enemy forces, through a
combination of naval engagement and conquest of the harbours. In this
theatre, destruction or capture of enemy forces would be even more
advantageous than normal, because of the long supply lines and the
time it would take to rebuild forces. The problem was that neither
side had an obvious advantage. A general engagement would be a risk
for the side that attempted it. It is likely that such an engagement
would have decided the outcome of the campaign one way or the other,
as indeed it did at Lake Erie. On Lake Ontario, decisive naval combat
was avoided.
What, then, was the
alternative? A series of raids, and attempts to catch individual
ships out by themselves, away from the fleet. These raids could take
the form of ground assaults with the aid of marine forces, which did
show some success – the American forces were able to capture
briefly a important British fort, and destroy a large ship that was
almost completed – or naval attack, such as the Battle of Lundy’s
Lane, where British forces raided the major American strongpoint on
Lake Ontario, causing considerable damage to equipment, and also to
the command structure. Sailing Master Barclay, the second in command
on the lake, blamed Commodore Chauncey’s brother for the incident
(he himself had been relieved of duty at the time, due to personal
indiscretions), and this meant that a good portion of the American
commander’s time was tied up with defending himself and his family
from accusations from Barclay and his supporters.
Intelligence was
available rather more easily than in many theatres. Deserters would
often simply cross the lake and make reports to the opposing
commander in return for the expected rewards. However, these reports
were often, as many such reports are, greatly exaggerated, or
tailored to match the assumed desires of the officer being reported
to. Chauncey believed that the Canadian force mustered between 1,000
and 1,500 men in 1812 – in fact the figure was 230.17
Later, Dearborn thought that 6,000 – 8,000 soldiers were stationed
at Kingston, whereas the real figure was nearer 3,000.18
Many such deserters, when their reports were found to be inaccurate,
were sent back to their original commanders, where they could expect
severe punishment. It is ironic that such actions were part of the
cause of the War of 1812.
The decisiveness of the
war as fought on Lake Erie as opposed to that fought on Lake Ontario
brings about one of the major questions relating to the Great Lakes
campaign. Was it the inability of the field commanders on Lake
Ontario that prevented a decisive battle, or was it simply not a
justifiable risk to take? A major naval action would very likely have
decided the issue for good, bringing the winners, it was believed,
major strategic advantages in the war. Although Commodore Yeo said,
“If he leave Kingston, I shall meet him. The result may be
doubtful, but worth the trial.”19,
he passed up several opportunities to back this up with real action.
At the time,
accusations of cowardice were laid against both commanders,
especially after the decisive action on Lake Erie, where the British
fleet was wiped out. Was the lack of a major, decisive action
indicative of cowardice? Naval doctrine at the time would have
suggested that a fleet action would have been the appropriate course
to take, according to the Royal Navy, but given the success of the
commerce raiders of the US Navy, it is doubtful whether the American
commander would have considered such a tactic, when more indirect
methods were serving his country well in other theatres.
Another point that
should be made is that this war was unlike any other fought in recent
history by either side. The US had little experience in naval combat,
and much of what little they had was based around the damage a small
power could do to a large one. All of their tactical and strategic
thinking had been put into defeating the British at sea, with little
consideration given to the Lakes at all until as late as 1810.
The British also had
problems. The Royal Navy certainly had vast naval experience by this
time, after twenty years of continuous war, but it was a sea war
against another major power, where there were reinforcements
available. If Nelson had been defeated at Trafalgar, there were other
ships, and admirals, available. If Yeo was defeated on Ontario,
however, there could be no new fleet for months, and the confined
nature of the Lakes would have meant that weeks, not months, would
have been required to ensure that the US Navy kept its naval
superiority throughout the war.
The risk, then, was a
definite and important factor to take into consideration. Another
point that must be raised is that finding the enemy could have been
the problem. Although the Lake was small, it was small only in a
relative sense. Hundreds of square miles of water are a lot of space
for a few small ships to be found in. Additionally, there were any
number of places to hide, spots along the coast where a fleet could
avoid action if it chose. Both commanders would have had to make the
decision to enter combat, or combat would not be engaged. Even an
attack on the central harbour would not guarantee that the fleet
would be present, as was the case when the British made the attempt.
It must therefore be
asked whether a conclusive engagement was advisable, or even
possible? Given the flow of intelligence between the two fleets, it
seems likely that battle could have been joined at some point, and if
both fleet commanders had decided upon an engagement, it should have
been possible. But would it have been advisable?
Whatever the strategic
possibilities actually were, both sides certainly believed that the
campaign on the Lakes was vital to the success of the war. Later on
in the war, it became even more important, as a victory or a defeat
could have had a major impact on the outcome of the peace
negotiations. With everything riding on the success of it, it is
quite understandable that neither commander would have dared to risk
a major engagement, especially with such even odds as existed. If one
side had an obvious advantage, it would likely have been a different
story, but this was not the case in this theatre. The best position
to take that this action was not the result of cowardice, but a
natural caution on the behalf of the commanders. It could easily be
claimed that the lack of action was proof of the quality of the
commander. A less able one, or one more inclined to the pursuit of
glory, might have taken the risk and caused either an excellent
victory or a crushing defeat.
There are many aspects
of the War of 1812 that are mirrored in the Lakes campaign. One of
these is the delay between declaration of war and actual combat. The
simple fact is that just as neither side was ready for war on the
Great Lakes, neither side was ready for war with the other. One of
the many disadvantages of the militia system that both sides used was
that it was extremely slow to get moving. It takes time to organize a
band of people into even a fighting mob. They have to first be
brought together into a single location, along with the required
supplies, something that on these frontiers could take months to
organize. Training was another delay, and then there was the natural
resistance to military service that many felt.
This was especially
true in the US, where feeling about the war was highly divided. Many
of the New England state refused point-blank to have anything to do
with the war, and they did not mobilize their state armies for
action. They even continued to trade with the British, going so far
as to trade goods that they knew were going directly to the British
forces in Canada. Such was the level of feeling in the US. It is
interesting that the states farthest from the Canadian border were
those who most vehemently argued for the war.
To be fair to the
planners of the US, Britain was the only power they had a shared
border with, and up to that point relations had been relatively
amicable. They had always planned to defend against coastal raids, or
more likely Indian attacks on their Western settlements and trade
routes.
The British forces were
similarly ill-fated in their actions against the US. Just as they had
little success on the Lakes, they actually accomplished relatively
little during the War, something that can be laid down partly to the
conditions, and partly due to the incompetence of the senior
commanders in the field. The raid on Washington was their one major
success in the war, revenge for a similar attack by the US on a
provincial city. On land, however, they made no serious incursions
into US territory that were not quickly thwarted, and the lines
stayed around the Canadian border for the whole of the war. They did
manage to prevent the US invasion of Canada that had been hoped for,
although again this was largely down to the unwillingness of the
militia to advance and the incompetence of the commanders in the
field, many of who had never seen action or worn a uniform until this
war.
The parallels to the
Lakes campaign are obvious. The victory on Lake Erie was obvious and
conclusive, but it was never really followed up, just like the
British attack on Washington. Lake Ontario was a stalemate throughout
the whole campaign, with no decisive action.
This was not a war in
the sense that the officers of the day really understood it. There
was no decisive battle. No Austerlitz, no Trafalgar, no Waterloo
would determine the final course of this War. The terrain simply was
not able to provide for such an engagement, and the communication,
supply, and population of the areas would not provide from the large
armies that were a crucial feature of the Western European War that
was the most widely studied in the period. The parallels with the
Peninsular War were probably greater, but this war was not as well
understood by the rest of the military establishment during this
period, and the officers and men who knew that war and that situation
best were in the Iberian Peninsular still fighting that war until
1814. It is interesting that when units were transferred from the
Peninsular to Canada the situation began to improve for the British.
At some point there was some discussion about sending Wellington over
to Canada to win the war in the same way as he had been seen to win
the war in Europe. It is an interesting statement on the war that
Wellington did not imagine that his performance would be any better
than the present commanders in the field. This was the statement of
the senior military thinker of Britain in this period, an indication
of how they saw the war.
The parallels as far as
naval warfare went are even more startling. The war on the Atlantic
Ocean did not consist of large naval actions, as they would have
resulted certainly in a crushing defeat for the tiny US Navy of the
time. Instead, a series of small, limited actions took place,
combined with commerce raiding. In this manner, the war was not very
different on the Lakes. Few decisive actions, and many limited
single-ship engagements.
Another fact to
consider is that many of the high military planners failed to grasp
that the situation along the Canadian border was totally different to
that of north-west Europe, where many of the previous studied wars
had taken place. This could partly be a consequence of not knowing
the terrain conditions first-hand, and the inaccurate mapping of the
period. A hundred miles looks like a short distance when it is a
centimetre on a map, but when those hundred miles is a treacherous
walk through dark forest and deep swamp, it is far more difficult.
Probably, too much was expected of the commanders in the field,
because no one could really understand why they were not immediately
successful. Little preparation of thought had gone into war in this
theatre before the war began, except that relating back to the Seven
Years War and the War of Independence, which in many ways were
totally different. Not only did Britain have a lot more force
available when it took Canada from the French during that war, but
Canada was a much smaller place in terms of population in those
times. A lot of immigration had taken place since then, notably of
American loyalists fleeing the Revolution.
Given the fact that
neither side was able to make any significant gains, it hardly seems
surprising that they both began to look upon the Great Lakes as
critical to their success. Britain was not doing well in the
propaganda war at sea, so naval victory on any theatre was of great
importance. The war on land was certainly not going the way of the
United States, largely because of the problems they faced in invading
Canada, and so they looked upon the Lakes as essential for their
advance. Britain similarly faced supply problems, and the Lakes would
have been useful to their supply access.
In many ways, this
campaign was critical to the survival of the US Navy. Although their
victories on the ocean were significant, the chief hero from that
part of the war, Oliver Hazard Perry, died young.20
Also, many of the victories were attained by privateers, or were
attained in such a way as to make a ‘privateers-only’ strategy
seemed to be a good one. If commerce raiding was the main part of a
national defence strategy, what need a large standing navy? The US
Navy looked to their victories on Lake Erie as a reason to continue
its existence, which during the early nineteenth century was in some
doubt, despite the undoubted maritime power states of the US.
(Indeed, it could be said that the maintenance of the US armed forces
is the main reason for the extravagant manner in which the war was
recorded by writes of the day, and the importance assigned to it by
historians – the US Armed forces looked to this war to provide
their heroes, in order to create some sort of popularity amoung the
people to influence the legislature.)
As has been seen,
however, the US Navy’s ‘victories’ in this war were far more
limited than the popular history records. As Sir James Yeo himself
said in May 1815, “The experience of two years active service has
served to convince me that tho’ much has been done by the mutual
exertions of both services, we also owe as much if not more to the
perverse stupidity of the Enemy; the impolicy of their plans; the
disunion of their Commanders, and, lastly, between them and their
Minister of War.”21
The peace negotiations
that ultimately ended the war22
are another example of how the perception of success was ultimately
all that was really desired. It has been mentioned that a victory was
needed for the success of the negotiations, but a little more detail
at this point is useful.
As is usual in war,
both sides had different aims, both mutually exclusive to the others’
policy. The British simply wanted a return to how matters stood
before the war, a status quo ante bellum. If great success
came, they might be able to secure advantages, but that, like the war
itself to them, was of little important. If the American desires
could be summed up in one small phrase, it would be ‘freedom of the
seas.’ The US economy was focused on maritime power, much like that
of Britain, except that it had little actual naval force to back that
up. Matters such as forced impressment were a series issue for the,
but far more important as always was the economic consideration, and
the legitimacy of the British blockade of the European ports. The US
wanted guarantees that any ship flying the American flag would be
allow safe and unrestricted passage to any port it may choose to
enter. Although the issue of a European blockade was winding to a
close with the defeat of Napoleon, the US still wanted those
guarantees.
As with any such
negotiation, success depending on having tools to bargain with that
the opponent lacked. Control of a portion of territory had
historically been one of the best methods of providing such political
advantages, and this was the major motivation behind the American
invasion of Canada. This, of course, backfired, and left the United
States behind at the bargaining table. British incursions into US
territory, including the burning of the White House, were far more
successful, and were worth a lot in the peace conference.
Demonstrations that deep penetrations into US territory were possible
at will made for an unsteady American delegation.
On the other hand, the
US could be said to be winning the war at sea, as they were fighting
it largely on their terms, rather than those of the British. The
stranglehold they were placing on British commerce was a serious
embarrassment, and created economic difficulties in the light of the
continuing war with France, difficulties the British government were
keen to see the end of. This too was worth considerable at the
bargaining table at the peace conference.
In the end, the final
result more closely resembled what the British sought than the
American goals. Britain had made the more obvious victory, especially
in terms of public appeal, although the Americans were perhaps
superior at presenting the information of their victories to the
public, possibly because of the general lack of interest of the
British population. Britain had made many successes during the War,
more so than the Americans, and this made itself felt in the
negotiations, although the Americans were given certain assurances
able specific issues, such as forced recruitment in American ports.
To be fair, it was really no longer as necessary with the War coming
to a close in Europe as well as in America. If anything, the Royal
Navy would soon find itself with too many serving sailors to be
profitably used, which would be a burden for a considerable time to
come. In terms of the economic motives for war, though, this conflict
was by no means a defeat for American mercantilism23,
instead directing it towards the continental pursuits that would
later prove so profitable.
The War of 1812, in
many terms, was something of a non-event. If such a war had been
fought in Europe, it would probably have been long since forgotten.
This war is made different by the mythology that has sprung up around
it. For the United States, this is the ‘Second War of
Independence’, a glorious fight against the evil oppressors from
whom they had freed themselves. For the US Navy, it provides the
heroes it needed to sustain themselves through fifty years of budget
cuts and Congressional apathy. For Canada, this is the foundation
myth, the true birth of their nation. For Britain, it is largely
ignored.
It can be said that war
on the Great Lakes was a practical stalemate. The victory on Lake
Erie was real, but Lake Ontario was the lake with the most potential,
and without any victory here, the Great Lakes campaign had little
positive effect on the war. Much had been hoped from it, but the
goals that were set could never have realistically been attained. It
could be said, though that the American victory on Lake Erie could
have influenced the peacemakers, as they signed the Treaty of Ghent,
which ended the war.
There is the question
of the negative effect on the war, of course – the theory that this
campaign was a sink of manpower and materiel. Judging by the
evidence, this is simply not true. The vast majority of the manpower
and materiel was procured from the surrounding area, and the limited
amounts of other equipment that were supplied were too insignificant
to be of any use on a larger scale, though they could have proved
decisive on the Lakes. There is the question of the supply of
experienced officers and seamen, of course, but for the Royal Navy,
they had sufficient supplies that the few sent to the Lakes could be
easily spared24,
and the US Navy was never effective enough at sea to indicate that
having additional officers present would have made any noticeable
difference. The war at sea was won by the British once war was
declared, the vast superiority of the Royal Navy made that obvious.
The outcome on the Lakes was far less clear.
So, we have seen that
this campaign had no real impact on what was really a rather limited
conflict. Two things, however, make it worthy of interest. The first
is the mythology – so many tales have been spun about this war that
separating fact from fiction can often be a great challenge. The
second is the fact that the Great Lakes campaign represents a war in
miniature. By examining this conflict, it is possible to see on a
smaller scale the nature of the larger conflict, for as stated
earlier, the parallels are manifold. It may in the long run have been
a meaningless war, but it was certainly an interesting one.
Footnotes
1
1812: Conservatives, War Hawks, and the Nation’s Honour, William
and Mary Quarterly, Vol. XVIII, No. 2
2
Reflections of George Hay, American Historical Review, Vol. XXXII,
No.1
3
The War of 1812 (Hickey), p11
4
Fur Trade Strategy, American Historical Review, Vol. XL, No. 2
5
A Signal Victory, p7
6
A Signal Victory, p7
7
A Signal Victory, p 17
8
Lords of the Lake, p330
9
The War of 1812 (Horseman), p52
10
The War of 1812 (Hickey), p73
11
Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, p31
12
Select British Documents of the Canadian War of 1812, p42
13
A Signal Victory, p25
14
Assistant Deputy Quartermaster General with special responsibility
of the Marine Department
15
Lords of the Lake, p29
16
The Naval War of 1812: A Documentary History, Vol. 1, p297
17
The Defended Border, p46
18
The Defended Border, p53
19
Sea Power in its Relation to the War of 1812, p45
20
Perry’s victory statement ‘We have met the enemy and they are
ours’ became one of the great slogans of the US Navy. (A Signal
Victory, p182)
21
An American Plan for a Canadian Campaign, American Historical
Review, Vol. XLVI, No. 2
22
Although typically, one of the most successful battle fought by the
US during this was, the Battle of New Orleans, happened a week after
the treaty had been signed, an example of the way communications lag
could affect matters at this time. Indeed, some naval ships would
not have learned that peace had been declared for months.
23
Age of Mercantilism, William and Mary Quarterly, Vol. XVI, No. 4
24
Indeed, by 1813 only a total of 848 seamen were required for duty in
the Lake Ontario Squadron, the larger of the two British squadrons –
this seems to be a mere drop in the ocean, in terms of Royal Naval
Manpower. (Selected British Documents of the War of 1812, Vol. 1, p
29)
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